The impact of unionization on wage inequality has been examined by a vast literature. Focusing mostly on the US and the UK in time series analyses or on OECD countries in panel data analyses, a bulk of these studies have found a negative impact of deunionization (i.e. decline in the union density rate) on distribution of wages. By utilizing two inequality data sets both provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project this paper contributes to the literature, analyzing the causality relationship between deunionization and pay inequality for 24 OECD countries for the 1963-2000 period within a panel Granger structure. Our findings show not only that there is causality from union density to income inequality but also, perhaps more importantly, point out that there is causality running from income inequality to union density for various set of countries and time periods.
Introduction
The decline in unionization rates and increasing income inequality have been two remarkable patterns in many OECD countries during the era of globalization. The structural change driven by globalization and technological change has led to increasing inequality. A number of developed countries have reformed their labor markets in the past two decades as a response to globalization. Changing wage-setting mechanisms and deunionization are two of these institutional changes. Therefore, it is observed that deunionization and increasing inequality have gone hand in hand in the neoliberal period in many OECD countries.
The literature suggests three main reasons for deunionization: abandoning fullemployment policies, and less union-and labor-friendly labor market reforms since the early 1980s; change in industrial composition of production; and increasing competition among firms.
The unions reduce wage inequality by standardizing wages among union members. That is, they increase wages for low skilled workers more than they do for skilled workers, improving the effect of the distribution of wages (Lewis 1986) . In this sense, deunionization is considered one of the key factors behind increasing income inequality in general, and pay inequality in particular, across the world.
Scholars have paid significant attention to this phenomenon, investigating the effect of the fall of union density on increasing income inequality. Many time series and panel data studies have made evident an improving effect of the unions on the distribution of wage.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that adopts a panel Granger causality method to analyze the possible relationship between union density and income inequality. This study aims at contributing to this literature by investigating this relationship with a panel Granger causality method.
This study is relevant for two reasons. First, it provides further evidence on the relationship between union density and income inequality by adopting a relatively recent panel Granger method for the first time. The second novelty of the study is to utilize two data sets, both provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project, which allows one to analyze a relatively larger time period of 1963-2000 for 24 OECD countries.
The next section briefly discusses the relationship between unionization and income inequality, and highlights the related empirical works. Section 3 introduces the methodology that we adopted. Following is Section 4, in which the data and model are presented, and Section 5 presents the results and discussion. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings.
Deunionization and Income Inequality
The decline in the unionization rates 2 and increasing pay/income inequality are two apparent trends for the majority of developed countries. One common fact that all major sources, such as Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the United Nations World Income Inequality Database (WIID) and the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), indicate is that inequality began rising in the early 1980s in OECD countries, sped up with the late 1980s, and slightly declined in the early 2000s (OECD 2012) . Overall, inequality has risen in many OECD countries in the last decade, except for some highly unequal countries like Chile, Mexico and Turkey (OECD 2012).
2 It is worth noting that there is some divergence in union density over time across countries rather than a convergence (Schnabel 2012) . That is, while there is overall decline in unionization, the differences in unionization rates are increasing across countries (for a comprehensive review see Blanchflower 2006) .
Increasing inequality went hand-in-hand with the structural change driven by globalization and technological development. Since this technological change benefits highskilled workers at the expense of low-skilled ones, it can be considered as the principal factor behind the widening wage inequality (Acemoglu et al 2011; Acemoglu 2002) . Another factor that contributes to this pattern during this era was a shift in the composition of jobs toward lower paid ones. For instance, women's employment has grown much faster than that of men.
However, the fact that women typically work part-time and are paid less has contributed to the widening in wage gaps within the workforce (OECD 2011). Income distribution has deteriorated in parallel to increasing wage inequality. In fact, increasing labor income inequality has been the underlying reason for the increase in income inequality, as wages and salaries account for 75 per cent of household incomes of working age-adults (OECD 2012).
Most of the OECD countries have deregulated their labor markets in the past two decades as a response to globalization. For instance, policy makers reduced the replacement rates of unemployment benefits and taxes on labor for low-income workers, and have improved employment protection legislation for workers with temporary contracts (OECD 2011). Wagesetting mechanisms have also changed in the past three decades. The trend of deunionization was another remarkable pattern across the OECD countries in this period.
Unionization is one of the important institutional factors that has an impact on the wage structure. The unions reduce wage inequality by standardizing wages among union members. On the other hand, they worsen wage inequality via crowding effect, as those who cannot find a job in unionized sectors move into non-unionized sectors, causing higher labor supply and therefore lowering wage levels in those sectors. However, unions also equalize the nonunion wage distribution by threatening union organization and enforcing the norms for fair pay (Western and Rosenfeld 2011) . As a matter of fact, empirical literature shows that the wage compressing effect overbalances the deteriorating effect (Freeman 1980 , 1984 , Freeman and Medoff 1984 , Card 1998 , Card et al 2004 , Metcalf et al 2001 . Since the unions increase wages for less skilled workers more than they do for skilled workers, they have an improving effect on the distribution of wages (Reynolds 1967 , Lewis 1986 , Lemieux 1993 , Chamberlain 1994 , DiNardo et al 1996 , Card 1996 , Kaufaman 2002 , Blanchflower and Bryson 2003 . Therefore, one reason behind the increasing wage inequality is the decline in the union membership over the period (Card 2001 , Acemoglu et al 2001 .
Three main reasons for deunionization have been noted in the literature (Carlin and Soskice 1990 , Acemoglu et al 2001 , Schmitt and Mitukiewicz 2012 . First, the neoliberal paradigm in the early 1980s created an extremely negative environment for unions with the abandonment of full-employment policies. Since that time, labor laws across the world have become much less union friendly, and unionizing new establishments has become harder (Blanchflower 2006) . Second, there is a shift in the industrial composition of production, toward where organizing union activity is more expensive (Checchi and Visser 2005 , Visser 2006 , Schnabel and Wagner 2007 , Ebbinghaus et al 2011 cited in Schnabel 2012 . Third, the product market competition among firms has increased (Acemoglu et al 2001) .
In addition to these three causes of deunionization, Acemoglu et al (2001) also emphasizes the role of technology. With increasing technology there is a shift in demand for skilled workers, and the labor supply does not adjust quickly enough to this change. In this context, Acemoglu et al (2001) argue that skill-biased technical change is not just a cause for rising inequality, but also for deunionization. Increasing productivity differentials weaken the coalition between skilled and unskilled workers over joining the trade unions since the improved outside opportunities (i.e. the competitive market return) reduce the incentives of skilled workers to join the union. That is, deunionization increases the original impact of skill-biased technical change on inequality as unions no longer compress the wages (Acemoglu et al 2001: 24) . Checchi et al (2007) , following the argument raised by Acemoglu et al (2001) , states that besides the common view that decline in unionization (i.e. less member and/or lower bargaining coverage) increases pay inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 2002 , DiNardo et al 1996 , Freeman 1980 , Rueda and Pontusson 2000 , Wallerstein 1999 , cited in Checchi et al 2007 (Checchi et al 2007: 22) .
There is a growing body of literature on the effect of deunionization on pay/income inequality (see Blanchflower 2006 , Stennek 2012 and Schnabel 2012 for comprehensive reviews on the other aspects of the (de)unionization). For example, Mosher (2007), Volscho and Fullerton (2005) , Western and Rosenfeld (2011 ), Gosling and Lemieux (2001 ), Freeman (1983 , DiNardo et al. (1996 ), Card (1992 ), Freeman (1993 However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that investigates the causality between the variables in question. Also, there is ambiguity in the direction of causality.
Considering these facts, this study attempts to fill this gap by investigating causality between union density and two different measures of income inequality in a panel data context by using the method by Hurlin and Venet (2001) .
Methodology
In this study, we employ the Granger causality method, originating from the seminal work of Granger (1969) . The method is broadly used to analyze causal effects between time series variables. The logic is that a cause cannot come after an effect, which means that the past can only predict the future; not vice versa. Therefore, the causal relationship between two variables can be determined by examining the way they move with respect to each other over time.
In that sense, a variable is said to Granger-cause another variable , if future values of can be predicted better by using past values of and , than by using the past values of only.
The standard Granger causality is not appropriate for panel data. Over the past few decades, some Granger-causality tests have been developed to incorporate panel data. Hurlin and Venet (2001) pointed out that a panel data dimension provides both cross-sectional and time series information and a large number of observations to utilize. Moreover, it substantially improves the efficiency of Granger causality tests by increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables (Greene, 2008; Baltagi, 2005) . Moreover, panel data allows for more flexibility in the modeling of the behavior of cross-sectional units than conventional time series analysis (Greene, 2008) . Hsiao (1989) , Weinhold (1996) , Weinhold (1999) , Nair-Reichart and Weinhold (2001) and Choe (2003) . The second approach, where the autoregressive coefficients and slope coefficients are treated as constants, is developed by Hurlin and Venet (2001) , Hurlin (2004a Hurlin ( , 2004b , and Hansen and Rand (2006) . There are some studies that adopt Hurlin and Venet (2001) 's approach to test causality for panel data (e.g, Hoffman, et al., 2005; Hood III, et al, 2008, Erdil and Yetkiner, 2009) .
In this study, we employ the second approach since we focus on a large number of crosssection units but relatively short time periods, and we also consider a small number of countries for a larger time period for comparison. The second approach allows the analysis not only for large N and small T, but also for small N and large T. In fact, Hurlin and Venet (2001) provides an extension of panel Granger causality also for large N and small T. 5 Hurlin and Venet (2001) also consider the possibility of instantaneous effects of on (includes the current value of as a regressor). However, we ignore this possibility since we are not concerned about an instantaneous relationship (and because it is unlikely that there is instantaneous effect between variables in our question); therefore we would prefer to focus on exploring to what extent the past values of could be of helping in predicting . Moreover, our definition of the best linear predictor is a straightforward extension of the conventional version of Granger causality method. coefficient slopes are assumed to be constant over time. Particularly, is assumed to be identical across individuals, while may differ across individuals, and p is the number of lags.
The residuals are assumed to satisfy the standard properties, i.e., they are independently, identically, and normally distributed, and free from heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Hence, the model above is a panel data model with fixed coefficients and established for Granger causality in a panel data context.
The conventional Granger causality tests raise two critical issues for a panel data case, both dealing with the potential heterogeneity of the individual cross sections. The first source of heterogeneity is cross sectional variation due to the distinctive intercepts; such heterogeneity may be addressed with a fixed effects model (i.e. it is controlled by introduction of individual effects in the model). The more crucial case is where heterogeneous slope coefficients should be considered (i.e. should be controlled by introducing individual dimension for regression slopes in the model). The second source of heterogeneity affects the causality relationships.
For instance, for some individuals the introduction of past values of may improve the forecast on , whereas for others there may be no improvement. Therefore, we should distinguish two subgroups of individuals according to the causality relationships between and . If this heterogeneity is not considered, the test of causality hypothesis may lead to a fallacious conclusion concerning the relative size of the two subgroups. In a nutshell, the Granger causality for panel data sets should consider the different sources of heterogeneity of the data-generating process. In this study, following Hurlin and Venet (2001) , both sources of heterogeneity mentioned above are controlled.
If we consider model (1), the general definitions of causality imply testing for linear restrictions on these coefficients. The procedure has three main steps, which are related to the homogeneous non-causality (HNC), homogeneous causality (HC) and heterogeneous noncausality (HENC) hypotheses.
HNC refers to the case in which there is no linear causality between dependent variable and explanatory variable for any cross section (the null hypothesis states non-existence of causal relationships across all cross sections, N).
The null and alternative hypotheses for the HNC case are:
To test these Np linear restrictions, the following Wald statistic is computed:
where RSS 2 denotes the sum of squared residuals obtained under H 0 , and RSS 1 denotes the sum of squared residuals produced by the unrestricted model in equation (1). If we assume the individual effects are fixed, both RSS 1 and RSS 2 are given by the RSS obtained from maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) that corresponds in this case to the fixed effects (FE) estimator.
HC means that there exists causality between and for all cross sections (the null hypothesis states existence of causal relationships across all cross sections, N).
The null and alternative hypotheses of the HC case are:
1, , , 1, ,
with the F-statistic being:
where RSS 3 corresponding to the realization of the sum of residual squares obtained when one imposes the homogeneity for each lag k of the coefficients associated to the variable . As for the HNC hypothesis test, if we assume that individual effects are fixed under H 0 and H a , the MLE estimator corresponds to FE estimator.
HENC refers to the situation in which at least one cross section unit does not indicate a causality relationship between and (the null hypothesis states non-existence of causal relationship for each cross section unit).
The null and alternative hypotheses of the HENC case are:
For that, we compute N statistics:
where RSS 2,i denotes the sum of residual squares obtained from model (1) could be considered as the consequence of the heterogeneity of the data-generating process (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for this procedure).
It is worth noting that for micro panels, where there are a large number of individuals (N) observed over a short period of time (T), the fixed effects estimator of the coefficients of endogenous lagged variables is biased and inconsistent (Nickell, 1981) . MLE for the dynamic fixed effects model remains biased with the introduction of exogenous variables when T is small.
In this situation, the estimators of coefficients of exogenous variables are also biased (Kiviet, 1995) . Nickell (1981) also showed that the presence of exogenous variables modifies the size of the bias on the coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables. Therefore, these issues imply that the Wald statistics concerning Granger causality tests do not have a standard distribution under the null hypothesis when T is small 6 . Moreover, one may still favor the FE estimator, arguing that its bias may not be large in this case. Hurlin and Venet (2001) assert that the test statistic obtained from the asymptotic distribution of F hnc converges to non-central parameters 6 On the other hand, Judson and Owen (1999) show that the FE estimator bias decreases with T.
(non-standard critical values) when T is small, whereas it converges to central parameters 
Data and Model
In our empirical analysis, which is based on country-level annual data, we attempt to test the causality between union density and income inequality. We utilize the most commonly used The between-group (T B ) of Theil's T statistic can be stated as 1 * *ln
where i indexes groups, p i is the population of group i, P is the total population, y i is the average wage in group i, and µ is the average wage of the entire population (Theil 1972 ).
The second data set, Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII), is also provided by the UTIP. The group calculates EHII by combining the UTIP-UNIDO data set and DeiningerSquire (1996) 
Since we deal with balanced panel cases for causality testing procedures in Hurlin and
Venet (2001), we limited our data set with those countries which have sufficient data of union density and inequality. Also, we excluded those who have less than 12 observations because of two reasons. First, although we have a large N-small T data set, we would like to consider the dynamics of variables in a relatively larger time period. Second, due to the lag structure of the models, degrees of freedom have to be taken into account. Therefore, we consider two alternative time periods for the models by restricting the data into a balanced panel, one with large N and small T in our case, and vice versa for comparison. Specifically, one set covers 13 countries during the period of 1963-1999, and the other covers 23 countries for a relatively shorter time period of 1986-1998 for union density-Theil model. Similarly, for the case of causality between union density and EHII, one data set includes 12 countries from 1963 to 2000, and the other covers 23 countries through the 1986-1997 period. Our data set has 24 OECD countries in total 7 . Descriptive statistics of the variables are provided in the Appendix (see Table   A1 ). Since we take into account time stationary VAR models, it is clear that the validity of the statistical estimates depends on stationarity of the data series. In other words, the variables in question should not include a unit root. We employ several panel unit root tests that are extensively used for panel data. Two of these tests, the Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit root test (Levin, Lin and Chu; 2002) We analyze two alternative causality effects between union density and income inequality. The first option is to examine the causality between union density and Theil index.
The following two time stationary VAR models are estimated for each of the time periods (i.e., 1963-1999 and 1986-1998) , separately:
Rather than choosing a certain lag length based on information criteria, we compute and report all relevant statistics for one, two and three lags in order to assess the sensitivity of the results of our models to the choice of the common lag-order. The second and the third lags are used to investigate a possible long run relationship between the variables. However, considering more than three lags would lead not only to the degrees of freedom problem for all models, but would also lack a theoretical basis.
In order to examine causality between union density and income inequality, the other alternative is to analyze causality between union density and EHII index. The following time stationary VAR two models are estimated for each of the time periods (i.e., 1963-2000 and 1986-1997) :
We estimate firstly (8) and (9) for the causality between union density and Theil; then we perform the testing procedure (test homogenous non-causality, HNC, homogenous causality, HC, and heterogeneous non-causality, HENC). Then we repeat the same exercises for model (10) and (11) for the causality between union density and EHII.
Results and Discussion
The right hand side of Table 2 presents the results of the HNC and HC tests for both directions of causality for each set of countries. Regarding causality from union density to inequality, while the HNC test statistic is statistically significant at one lag during the period 1963-1999 with 13 countries for Theil, and at three lags during the period 1963-2000 with 12 countries for EHII; it is statistically significant at all three lags for Theil (during the period of 1986-1998 with 23 countries), and only at three lags for EHII (during the period of 1986-1997 with 23 countries). This allows us to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that for at least one country, there is statistical evidence that union density Granger causes inequality.
The left hand side of Table 2 shows the HNC statistics used to examine the hypothesis that inequality Granger causes union density. Accordingly, the HNC test statistic indicates that there is a significant Granger causality for Theil at one and three lag, only during the 1986-1998
period. Regarding EHII, on the other hand, the HNC test statistic is statistically significant at all three lags during the 1963-2000 period and at three lags during the 1986-1997 period. The HC hypothesis is designed to examine the homogeneity of the causal relationship. In order to test whether union density Granger causes inequality for all countries, we compute HC test statistics. Failure to reject HC hypothesis shows that the causal process is homogeneous for all countries. We need to go on the testing procedure since HC statistics, which are calculated for significant HNC, confirm that none of the causality relationships are homogenous for either union density to Theil or to EHII, for both sets of countries. However, regarding causality from inequality to union density, HC statistics are significant only during the 1986 period (in Theil) and 1986 -1997 . In sum, we can reject HC for the relationships in question; we need to go on with the next test procedure to determine the heterogeneity of the causal process across the countries for significant HC statistics that depend on the lag structures. period 1963-1999 1986-1998 1986-1998 1986-1998 1963-2000 1986-1997 causality Significance denoted by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
At the final step, we test the HENC hypothesis in order to determine countries that have causality. Rejection of HENC hypothesis shows the existence of a causal relationship for a certain country in our sample. In Table 3 , HENC results indicate that for Chile, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey, union density Granger causes Theil pay inequality; for Australia, Chile, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Spain, and the UK, union density causes EHII. 1986-1998 1986-1998 1986-1997 Variables Significance denoted by *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
In the same manner, Table 4 shows that while for Chile, Greece, Israel, and Korea there is Granger causality from Theil to union density, there exists Granger causality from EHII to union density for Germany, Greece, Israel, and New Zealand. Considering the causality relation, Tables 3 and 4 show that for Chile, Ireland, Japan, Norway, and Turkey, the causality is not just very strong but also valid at all lags analyzed. Overall, these findings make three facts evident about the relationship between union density and pay/income inequality. First, the study yields substantial evidence for causality between union density and income inequality in a panel structure. Our findings that there exists causality only for 14 out of 24 countries in total does not contradict with the findings of the early studies that have time-series or panel data analysis. The difference in adopted method, time periods and set of countries prevents us from making a direct comparison with the early studies.
In fact, it is plausible to argue that this study yields highly supportive evidence for the nexus of deunionzation-income inequality, providing substantial evidence for causality between the variables in question.
Second, considering detected causalities, it appears that the results are sensitive to how we measure inequality. Out of 14 countries, only for three countries (Chile, Ireland and Israel) does the causality exist for both inequality variables. At this point, it is worth recalling the difference between Theil and EHII. While the former is pay inequality in the manufacturing sector, the latter is computed by combining the former and the household income inequality set by Deininger-Squire (1996) to reflect household income inequality.
Third, our findings show that causality not only runs from union density to inequality (10 countries) but also the other way around (six countries). This is of importance, since the link from pay inequality toward unionization has not been received enough attention in the empirical literature. That is, these results provide supportive evidence for those who argue that not only does deunionization cause higher income inequality, but also inequality affects the incentive to join the unions (Acemoglu et al 2001; Checchi et al 2007) .
Conclusion
The effect of deunionization resulted by globalization and changing technology on the distribution of wages has received significant attention by scholars as the neoliberal era has witnessed a remarkable pattern of declining union density and increasing income inequality across the OECD countries. Although there are a few studies which found positive or no relationship between union density and income inequality, the bulk of the available literature, both time series and panel data studies, provide substantial evidence on the negative impact of deunionization on the distribution of wages (and income).
The study contributed to this vast literature by examining the relationship in question by utilizing two alternative novel data sets for pay and income inequality, both provided by the University of Texas Inequality Project, and adopting a panel Granger causality method. This method allows us to investigate the existence of the relationship between union density and inequality measure variables without depending upon a restrictive a priori theory. Therefore, this approach allows us to study a higher number of countries for an extended time period.
Covering 24 OECD countries and a relatively wide range of time periods (i.e. 1963-2000) we analyze the relationship between union density and pay inequality and a proxy index for income inequality. Regardless of chosen lag structures, time periods, and sets of countries, overall findings show that there is substantial evidence on the existence of the relationship between union density and income inequality in a panel data context. Accordingly, the causality is detected for 14 out of the total 24 countries in question. While for Australia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Turkey, and the UK there is significant Granger causality from union density to inequality, for Greece, Israel, and Korea the causality is from inequality to union density, and Chile and New Zealand present bidirectional causality. Also, it is worth mentioning that our results suggest that for Chile, Ireland, Japan, Norway, and Turkey, the causality is not just very strong but also valid at all lags that were analyzed. Considering the fact that there are six countries in which causality runs from inequality to union density, it is plausible to argue that not only does deunionization have a negative (as the previous literature shows) effect on the distribution of wages, but also increasing inequality affects the decision on union membership.
This finding suggests that there is need to take into account bidirectional relationship between the variables in further analyses. Overall, our findings are highly consistent with the related literature in the sense that it made evident a statistically significant relationship between the variables in question with a different method.
In this study, we use three step testing process developed for balanced data sets by Hurlin and Venet (2001) . In fact, it may be possible to adopt another method to consider an unbalanced panel data for our case, where one can analyze the relationship for a higher number of countries.
This, however, could be an interest of further studies.
